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A CIVIL DISCOVERY DILEMMA FOR THE 
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT 
Carl Tobias* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The growing balkanization of federal civil procedure has received 
considerable critical commentary. Numerous members of Congress and the 
federal judiciary, lawyers and legal scholars have lamented the fate of the 
national procedure code. The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure hoped to establish those rules as a model that the states could 
adopt, thus fostering national and intrastate procedural uniformity. This 
objective was not realized generally or by very many specific jurisdictions. 
Observers of the increasingly fractured procedural regime in the federal 
arena have voiced concerns about the mounting numbers of strictures, the 
accelerating pace of procedural change and the growing inconsistency of 
the requirements imposed. Illustrative are the major 1983 and 1993 federal 
discovery amendments, which new discovery provisions further revised in 
December 2000. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 concomitantly 
encouraged all ninety-four federal districts to prescribe local procedures for 
reducing expense and delay in civil litigation, and these measures conflicted 
with the Federal Rules. The fragmentation described above is most clearly 
manifested in the area of discovery, which is a critical feature of many 
modem civil lawsuits. 
The precise effects of this federal procedural activity on state civil 
process over the last two decades are unclear. However, numerous 
jurisdictions have declined to adopt either the substantial 1983 or 1993 
federal rules amendments, a situation that the new set of federal 
modifications promises to exacerbate. Rule revisors in a significant number 
of state systems might have wisely chosen to await a period of quiescence 
in federal procedural change before undertaking additional reform. In any 
event, the federal developments described above may have adversely 
affected state civil process, or at least made civil procedure in the United 
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States much more inconsistent than the 1938 drafters contemplated. 
Although Congress, judges, attorneys and legal academicians have devoted 
considerable attention to federal procedure, these observers have essentially 
ignored the impacts of federal developments on state civil process. The 
comparatively limited comment those effects have received is unfortunate, 
because the individuals and entities with responsibility for state procedural 
reform often have derived helpful guidance from activities at the federal 
level. 
In this increasingly byzantine world of civil procedure, there is one 
bastion of uniformity: Arizona civil procedure. The Arizona Supreme 
Court, which has authority for amending the Arizona Rules of Civil 
Procedure, has steadfastly attempted to maintain consistency between 
Arizona state civil procedure and the Federal Rules. The Justices' efforts 
may even suggest that members of the court found it preferable to be 
uniform rather than right. Indeed, Arizona has occasionally surpassed the 
federal rule revisors by instituting changes which they had not adopted or 
had merely proposed. Illustrative is the 1992 imposition of presumptive 
temporal limitations on depositions, strictures that those responsible for 
altering the Federal Rules have only recently decided to implement. 
Another example is Arizona's provision for mandatory pre-discovery 
disclosure promulgated approximately two years before the federal proviso 
that required disclosure took effect. 
In September 1999, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the 
policymaking arm of the federal courts, approved a comprehensive package 
of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
discovery. The United States Supreme Court promulgated the set of 
discovery revisions during April 2000 and the amendments became 
applicable in December 2000 because Congress did not reject or modify the 
package in the subsequent seven months. This group of federal rules 
amendments constitutes the fourth substantial change in the federal 
discovery provisions over the last two decades. 
Arizona now confronts a dilemma. The Arizona Supreme Court must 
decide whether it should continue to honor the longstanding tradition of 
preserving consistency between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. This difficulty is complicated 
because Arizona has recently participated in considerable discovery reform, 
which differs somewhat from the federal discovery regime. Moreover, the 
Arizona bench and bar may believe that their discovery system is superior 
to the existing federal scheme in that it better serves the needs of the 
Arizona judiciary, lawyers, parties and citizens. Furthermore, the patience 
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of Arizona judges, attorneys and litigants for discovery reform may well 
have been exhausted. This article analyzes the convergence of federal and 
Arizona civil discovery regimes and the implications of recent federal 
discovery amendments. 
Section II examines the origins and development of the civil discovery 
systems of the federal and Arizona trial courts and the important issue of 
procedural uniformity. It specifically scrutinizes the current situation in the 
federal sphere and in Arizona with emphasis on the federal provisions that the 
United States Supreme Court recently prescribed and the reform of Arizona 
discovery throughout the 1990s. This section concludes that the new 
federal amendments present a conundrum for Arizona. 
Section III of the paper offers suggestions for resolving this dilemma. 
The Arizona Supreme Court must essentially decide whether it is preferable 
to be consistent or correct. The determination will require the Justices to 
undertake a finely-calibrated analysis which involves a complex 
constellation of relevant factors. The Arizona Supreme Court must 
consider, for instance, the benefits and disadvantages of uniformity, the 
efficacy of new federal revisions and recently-instituted modifications in the 
Arizona discovery regime, and the tolerance of the Arizona bench and bar 
for additional change in the discovery scheme. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL AND ARIZONA CIVIL 
DISCOVERY REGIMES 
The historical background of the federal and Arizona systems of civil 
discovery requires comparatively limited examination here, as the origins 
and development of those procedural schemes have been rather thoroughly 
chronicled elsewhere. 1 Nonetheless, considerable exploration of the 
respective discovery regimes is justified because it improves understanding 
of modern discovery in the federal and Arizona trial courts and because of 
the difficulty that the new federal amendments pose for Arizona. 
1. E.g., Symposium, Conference on Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517 ( 1998); 
Symposium, Mandating Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to 
Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 
(1993). 
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A. The Federal System 
1. The Original Federal Rules 
The original Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory 
Committee), comprising nine prominent members of the legal profession 
and five well-respected law professors, relied on several fundamental tenets 
in crafting the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became 
effective in 1938.2 The drafters meant for the rules to elevate substance 
over form and to implement simple, non-technical approaches to 
procedure.3 In fact, "[t]he concept of uniformity among federal district 
courts, between federal and state courts, and among the states represents a 
variation on the idea of simplicity."4 
The Advisory Committee also intended to foster merits-based resolution 
of civil disputes after litigants and lawyers had secured discovery of the 
maximum possible information which was relevant to their cases. 5 The 
drafters correspondingly meant the discovery scheme to be rather open-
ended and to accord attorneys substantial control over the pretrial process 
and discovery.6 Moreover, the Advisory Committee envisioned that judges 
would administer discovery in a flexible, liberal manner, thereby facilitating 
the disclosure of all applicable material and promoting settlement or 
disposition on the merits.7 
2. E.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 494, 502-15 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) 
[hereinafter Subrin, Equity]; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 74 CORNELLL. REV. 270, 272-77 (1989). 
3. See CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965); accord 
James William Moore, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 l.C.C. PRACT. J. 41, 42 
(1938). 
4. Tobias, supra note 2, at 274; accord Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American 
Civil Procedure, 67 AB.A. J. 1648, 1650 (1981) [hereinafter Subrin, New Era]. 
5. See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374, 397 (1982). 
6. Alexander Holtzhoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057 (1955); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 717-34 (1998) 
[hereinafter Subrin, Fishing]; see also id. at 692-701 (analyzing the history of discovery in the 
federal courts prior to 1938). 
7. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 438-39; Subrin, New Era, supra note 4, at 1648-50. 
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2. The Federal Rules During the First Three Decades 
This system appeared to work comparatively well for the quarter-century 
which following the adoption of the original Federal Rules during 1938. 
The procedure code functioned efficaciously, and federal district court 
judges successfully applied the rules to federal civil lawsuits.8 The United 
States Supreme Court promulgated relatively few amendments, most of 
which federal court observers fairly characterized as "clarifying" revisions.9 
A significant number of states premised their civil procedure rules on the 
federal analogues, while additional jurisdictions modeled specific strictures 
or provisions governing particular procedural areas, namely discovery, on 
the Federal Rules. 10 
The broad, flexible system of procedure instituted by the initial rules 
essentially enabled plaintiffs and the litigants' counsel to employ general 
notice pleading, to acquire comprehensive information through discovery 
and to reach the merits of controversies. 11 There were, however, certain 
difficulties with the regime which the 1938 Federal Rules implemented. 
Liberal pleading and tactical exploitation of the procedures were 
problematic, especially in protracted and complex cases. 12 More 
specifically, some members of the federal bench and legal commentators 
claimed that the open-ended character of discovery permitted very 
expansive requests for material and that district judges evinced reluctance to 
enforce various discovery requirements with the requisite rigor. 13 
Despite these criticisms, the original Federal Rules "continued to enjoy 
good, albeit less glowing, press and continued to function reasonably well," 
even as late as the 1960s. 1 The Supreme Court prescribed a comparatively 
small number of changes, few of which were substantive and most of which 
8. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958: Two 
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 445 (1958); Resnik, supra note 2, 
at 515-17; Subrin, Equity, supra note 2, at 910. 
9. See Charles E. Clark, 'ClarifYing' Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 241 (1953); Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal 
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2 (1976). 
10. See Clark, supra note 8, at 435; John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules 
in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 
368--69 ( 1986). 
11. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 439; Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur 
or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. l (1984). 
12. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 516; Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 734-39. 
13. E.g., New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 
206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 
COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958); see also Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 734-39. 
14. Tobias, supra note 2, at 285; accord Resnik, supra note 2, at 515-16. 
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reflected the goals of the initial Advisory Committee. 15 Particularly 
significant to this article is the important 1970 package of revisions in the 
discovery strictures that effectively left intact the notion of lawyer control. 16 
3. The Federal Rules During the Second Three Decades 
By the early 1970s, certain federal court observers-especially leaders of 
the bench and bar, such as Chief Justice Warren BurRer-had begun raising 
concerns about the so-called "litigation explosion."1 Counsel and parties 
allegedly pursued too many civil actions, while a large percentage of these 
cases purportedly lacked merit. 18 Most important, some judges, practicing 
lawyers and legal scholars asserted that discovery was too broad, expensive 
and time-consuming. 19 Concern about attorney abuse of the discovery 
process prompted the Supreme Court to amend the provisions governing 
discovery in 1980. However, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., authored a 
dissent from this decision because he thought that the changes only 
"tinkered" with the existing discove?c; system, rather than instituted the kind 
of thoroughgoing reform necessary. 0 Three years thereafter, the Supreme 
Court adopted a comprehensive package of revisions, many involving 
discovery. The Justices intended to enlarge the responsibilities of counsel 
as officers of the court and to increase judicial case management, 
particularly of the pretrial process and discovery.21 For example, 
15. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 397 n.2; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
16. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 748-50 
(1998) [hereinafter Marcus, Discovery]; Miller, supra note 11, at 14-15; see also supra notes 6-
7 and accompanying text. 
17. E.g., Nat'! Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FuTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) 
[hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE]. 
18. E.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Warren E. Burger, Agenda 
for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 17, 
at 23; Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 
(1987). 
19. E.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 441-43; Miller, supra note 11, at 6-11; Maurice 
Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 
1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579. 
20. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980). 
"Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely 
effective reforms." Id. at 1000; see also Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 756-60 
(analyzing the revisions). But see Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998). 
21. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461U.S.1097 (1983). See 
generally Arthur R. Miller, The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
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amendments in Federal Rules 16 and 26 narrowed the scope of discovery 
somewhat and accorded district judges considerably greater control over the 
pace and amount of discovery22 while admonishing that jud~es should make 
discovery commensurate with the needs of individual cases. 3 
One decade later, the Supreme Court promulgated another thorough 
group of rule changes, several of which substantially modified discovery. 
The most important alteration was the controversial revision in Federal Rule 
26 that prescribed mandatory pre-discovery disclosure. 24 This provision 
required parties to exchange specific information before commencing 
formal discovery.25 The 1993 amendments also imposed presumptive 
limitations on the number of interrogatories. 26 
The United States Supreme Court recently promulgated a new set of 
discovery changes, many of which are appropriately denominated 
"conforming" or "technical" revisions.27 Most significant, this package of 
amendments narrows the scope of discovery to which parties have 
traditionally been entitled. 28 Litigants will no longer be able to secure 
information that is "relevant to the subject matter" of the lawsuit, in the 
absence of a court order, but they will be entitled only to material which is 
"relevant to the claim."29 The new provisions would concomitantly narrow 
Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility (Federal Judicial Center 
1984) (analyzing the 1983 amendments favorably). 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983) (amended 1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1983) (amended 2000). 
For analysis of the changes to Rule 16, see Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818 (1988); Subrin, Equity, supra note 2, at 978-79. 
23. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l) (1983) (amended 2000). For analysis of proportionality, see 
Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 760-64; Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 744-45. 
24. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(l) (1993) (amended 2000); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice 
Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 576-81 (analyzing the controversial revision). 
25. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(l) (1993) (amended 2000). For analysis of disclosure, see Griffin 
B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 
(1992); Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 264-71 
(l 992). 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (a)(2)(A) (1993) (amended 2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (a); see also 
Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 765-{)8 (analyzing the set of revisions); Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" A Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 
SMU L. REv. 229, 233-36 (1999); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial 
Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1616-17 (1994) (analyzing presumptive 
limitations). 
27. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 388 (2000) 
[hereinafter 2000 Amendments]. 
28. See id.; see also Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 3 l CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1439-
40 (1999) (analyzing the major changes proposed). 
29. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) (1993) (amended 2000) with FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(l) (1993); see also supra 2000 Amendments, note 27, at 388; Thornburg, supra note 26, 
at 238-39 (analyzing the revision). 
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the scope of automatic disclosure, so that parties will have to divulge less 
information before undertaking formal discovery.30 . The disclosure stricture 
would have nationwide applicability which means that all of the ninety-four 
federal districts, including Arizona, cannot continue to apply disclosure 
requirements which differ from the Federal Rule.31 Moreover, the revisions 
would limit depositions to "one day of seven hours," unless a longer period 
is "authorized by the court or stipulated by the parties."32 Finally, the 
package includes a number of conforming or technical modifications which 
this article does not examine. 33 
B. The Arizona System 
1. The Arizona Rules During the First Five Decades 
Arizona has essentially modeled its civil procedure and discovery 
regimes on the Federal Rules· of Civil Procedure for many years. The 
Arizona Supreme Court apparently chose to follow the federal provisions 
because doing so would make civil practice in the federal and state courts of 
Arizona uniform and simple, which were central objectives of the attorneys 
and legal academicians who drafted the 1938 Federal Rules.34 For example, 
when the United States Supreme Court promulgated the significant federal 
discovery revisions during 1970, 35 the Arizona Supreme Court 
simultaneously prescribed major amendments in the Arizona rules 
governing discovery that effectively conformed to the federal changes.36 
Indeed, the Arizona State Bar Committee Notes, which accompanied the 
30. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B) (1993) (amended 2000) with 2000 
Amendments, supra note 27, at 382. See also Tobias, supra note 28. 
31. The 1993 revision permitted districts to reject or modify the federal requirements, but 
the Arizona District did neither. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a) (1993) (amended 2000) with 
2000 Amendments, supra note 27, at 384; see also Thornburg, supra note 26, at 235-36 
(discussing the opt-out provision in the 1993 rules); Tobias, supra note 26, at 1612-15 (same). 
32. See 2000 Amendments, supra note 27, at 393 (amending Rule 30(d)(2)); see also 
supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing earlier presumptive limitations). 
33. See 2000 Amendments, supra note 27, at 382 et seq.; see also Thornburg, supra note 
26 (affording additional analysis of the revisions). 
34. Carol Campbell Cure, Practical Issues Concerning Arizona's New Rules of Civil 
Procedure: A Defense Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 56 n.6 (1993); see also supra notes 3-4 
and accompanying text. 
35. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
36. Compare the 1970 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26, 29-30, 
33-37, with the 1970 version of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26, 29-30, 33-37. 
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Arizona Justices' modifications, trenchantly stated that the "1970 revision 
of rules is the first substantial alteration of discovery practice since the rules 
were first adopted in 1939."37 
When the United States Supreme Court implemented the important 
package of federal amendments during 1983,38 the Arizona Supreme Court 
concomitantly instituted significant revisions that narrowed the scope of 
discovery, accorded trial judges greater control over discovery's timing and 
amount, and mandated that judges tailor discovery to the requirements of 
specific cases. 39 The purposes and phraseology employed by the Arizona 
Justices show that the Arizona Supreme Court essentially modeled the 1984 
changes in Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26 on the 1983 federal 
rules amendments.40 In fact, the State Bar Committee Notes attending the 
1984 revision in Rule l 6(b) expressly observed that the modification was 
"intended to retain as much conformity with the federal rule as is consistent 
with the needs of the state court system."41 The State Bar Committee 
Notes, which accompanied the 1984 alteration in Rule 26, concomitantly 
stated that the change was "aimed at preventing both excess discovery and 
evasion of reasonable discovery devices" and was "intended to deal directly 
with the problem of duplicative and needless discovery."42 The Committee 
Notes correspondingly remarked that the modification "should encourage 
judges to identify instances of unnecessary discovery and to limit the use of 
the various discovery devices accordingly," while the "new provision 
contemplates earlier and greater judicial involvement in the discovery 
process" in recognition that "discovery cannot always be self-regulating."43 
2. The Arizona Rules During the Last Decade 
The Arizona and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remained similar, if 
not identical, until the 1990s. At this time, judges, lawyers, litigants and 
members of the public in Arizona seemingly perceived the existence of 
phenomena-phenomena which were analogous to those developments that 
37. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26 State Bar Comm. Notes (1970) (amended 2000); see also infra 
note 44 (suggesting that Arizona experienced "congestion and delay" in the 1950s and 1970s ). 
38. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
39. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26 (1984) (amended 2000); see also supra notes 22-23 and 
accompanying text (analyzing comparable federal rules revisions). 
40. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983) (amended 1993) and FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b) 
(1983) (amended 2000), with ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 16, 26(a), (b) (1984) (amended 2000). 
41. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 16 State Bar Comm. Notes (1984) (amended 2000). 
42. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26 (a), (b) State Bar Comm. Notes (1984) (amended 2000). 
43. Id.; see also supra notes 6, 16 and accompanying text (analyzing self-regulation). 
624 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
had prompted the United States Supreme Court to promulgate the 1983 and 
1993 federal rules amendments. 44 The state, and perhaps more importantly 
Maricopa County, were experiencing a "litigation explosion" and changes 
in the civil litigation process. The Arizona Supreme Court and state district 
judges responded with alterations of the provisions that were applicable to 
the pretrial process, particularly discovery. This culminated with action by 
the Arizona Supreme Court and the Arizona State Bar. 
In March of 1990, the Supreme Court and the State Bar "appointed the 
Special Bar Committee to Study Civil Litigation Abuse, Cost and Delay, 
which was specifically charged with the task of studying problems 
pertaining to abuse and delay in civil litigation and the cost of civil 
litigation."45 After this entity undertook an extensive assessment, the 
Committee members determined that the American civil litigation system 
was imposing undue expense, requiring excessive time to complete cases 
and threatening to limit court access for average citizens. 46 The entity 
concomitantly concluded that certain adjustments in the dispute resolution 
process and the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure were necessary to 
conserve financial and temporal resources and decrease abuse "while 
preserving the tradition of jury trial" as a means of deciding civil lawsuits.47 
Justice Thomas A. Zlaket of the Arizona Supreme Court elaborated and 
specified the concerns which the Committee and additional observers had 
articulated.48 The Committee and the observers ascertained that the 
changing legal culture in the country, and seemingly in Arizona, fostered 
"'scorched earth' litigation tactics designed to wage economic 'paper wars' 
of attrition on opponents, a new generation of 'litigators' who do not try 
cases" and pre-trial discovery as an end in itself.49 Moreover, Justice Zlaket 
asserted, "huge numbers of interrogatories, marathon depositions, multiple 
44. Supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. For analysis of"delay and congestion" in 
the 1950s and 1970s, see Heinz Hink, Judicial Reform in Arizona, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 13, 14-15 
(1964); Richard B. Cuatto, Note, A Statistical Analysis of the Civil Caseload in Arizona, 1973 
LAW & SOC. ORDER 143, 162 (1973). 
45. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; see also Tobias, supra 
note 26, at 1601 (analyzing the work of a similar entity at the federal level). 
46. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; see also Michael A. 
Yarnell, A Judicial View: Living With the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 
35-38 (1993); Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil 
Rules, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1993). 
47. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.1 Court Comment to 1991 Amendment. 
48. Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3-4; see also Symposium Conference on Discovery Rules, 
supra note 1 (several of the symposium papers also allude to these concerns). 
49. See Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text 
(expressing similar ideas). 
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experts, voluminous document requests and other similar tactics have 
become today's norm."50 The jurist correspondingly contended that the 
abuses detected by a number of the observers "have badly distorted the 
proper role of the advocate in our system," while discerning an "increase in 
abusive, obstructive and contentious behavior by members of the bar."51 
During September, 1990, the Committee proposed a thorough package of 
rule amendments, principally governing discovery.52 The Committee 
intended the amendments to reduce inefficiency, cost and delay in the 
Arizona state courts as well as increase the public accessibility of the 
judicial system. 53 The Committee meant to establish a framework that 
would facilitate the discovery of sufficient information "to avoid litigation 
by ambush" and foster professionalism among attorneys while proclaiming 
that its ultimate objectives were enhancing voluntary cooperation and 
increasing information exchange. 54 The Committee concomitantly intended 
to eliminate "hostile, unprofessional and unnecessarily adversarial" 
behavior by practitioners. 55 The entity also admonished trial court judges to 
"deal in a strong and forthright fashion with discovery abuse and discovery 
abusers. "56 
The Arizona Supreme Court subjected the proposals that the Committee 
had proffered to experimentation in 8000 cases that counsel and litigants 
pursued in Maricopa County during 1990 and 1991, while the Justices 
afforded members of the public extensive opportunities for comment on the 
Committee's recommendations.57 Justice Zlaket stated that the "new rules 
should not have come as any surprise [because for] several years, similar 
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been under 
consideration."58 
50. See Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3. 
51. Zlaket, supra note 46, at 3-4; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text 
(expressing similar ideas). 
52. See Zlaket, supra note 46, at 2-3. 
53. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; see also infra note 59 and 
accompanying text (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the package proposed). 
54. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.; see also supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (suggesting that similar ideas 
animated the 1983 and 1993 federal rules amendments). 
57. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.l Court Comment to 1991 Amendment; Zlaket, supra note 46, at 
8; see also Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 11 
(1993) (analyzing the experimentation). 
58. Zlaket, supra note 46, at 8; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text 
(analyzing the similar changes to the federal rules). 
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In December, 1991, the Arizona Supreme Court promulgated the 
comprehensive package of amendments, which the Committee had 
proposed during September, 1990, and on July 1, 1992, those revisions 
became effective. 59 The most controversial aspect of the alterations was the 
provision for compulsory pre-discovery disclosure in Arizona Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26.1.60 This modification required litigants to divulge thoroughly 
and simultaneously all relevant material that was known by or available to 
the parties or their counsel at the beginning of cases and before the initiation 
of formal discovery.61 Additional amendments imposed presumptive 
limitations on discovery-namely oral depositions, written interrogatories 
as well as requests for production and requests for admission-which could 
be changed by litigant stipulation or court order.62 The revisions also 
enhanced judicial management of the pretrial process as a general matter 
and courts' control over discovery specifically. For instance, the provisions 
increased the authority of judges to monitor the pace and scope of discovery 
through pretrial conferences while mandating that trial courts impose 
sanctions on parties or practitioners who abuse the litigation system. 63 
In 1997, the Arizona Supreme Court implemented another reform in the 
civil discovery scheme. 64 The Justices altered Rule 3 7 to provide guidance 
for judicial treatment of information which parties and lawyers reveal late in 
59. Amendments to: Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291 
app. (1993); see also ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26 State Bar Comm. Notes (1984) (amended 2000) 
(stating that Superior Court Uniform Rules of Practice were transferred to the Arizona Rules of 
Civil Procedure or the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court). 
60. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.l (amended 1991). For criticism of disclosure, see Colin 
Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation and the Ethics of Mandatory Disclosure: Moving 
Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 244--47 (1993); Robert J. Bruno, The 
Disclosure Rule is a Mistake, MARICOPA LAW. l (1992). 
61. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.l (amended 1991). For analysis of disclosure, see Cure, supra 
note 34, at 57-91; Francis J. Burke, Jr. & Karen A. Potts, Arizona's New Zlaket Rules and the 
Private Practitioner: Death of Rambo?, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 101-14 (1993); Jolene Mills, 
Practical Implications of the Zlaket Rules from a Plaintifj's Lawyer's Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 149, 156-65 (1993); supra note 25 and accompanying text (analyzing the federal disclosure 
rule). 
62. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 33.1, 34(b), 36(b) (amended 1991). For analysis of the Arizona 
presumptive limitations, see Cure, supra note 34, at 91-95; Yarnell, supra note 46, at 49-50; 
see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (analyzing the federal presumptive limitations). 
63. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16, 26 (amended 1991); see also Zlaket, supra note 46, at 8 
(analyzing the Arizona provisions); Myers, supra note 57, at 17, 20--28 (analyzing provisions' 
application); Yarnell, supra note 46, at 38-43 (analyzing both); supra notes 21-23 and 
accompanying text (analyzing analogous federal provisions). 
64. I rely in this paragraph on ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(l) (amended 1997). Interviews with 
Patience T. Huntwork, Chief Staff Attorney, Ariz. Sup. Ct. (Oct. 8, 1999 & Sept. 12, 2000) (on 
file with author). 
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the process, especially material that litigants or attorneys divulge 
immediately before the commencement of trial. The Supreme Court 
apparently intended this measure to be the last fine-tuning of the reforms 
which the Justices had instituted in the 1990s. 
3. Summary By Way of Transition 
The Arizona Supreme Court maintained a discovery system closely 
modeled on the federal approach and essentially premised the Arizona 
Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery on the federal analogues for a 
half-century. The Arizona Supreme Court only departed from this practice 
in meaningful ways during the 1990s when the Justices decided to institute 
significant reform of civil discovery. The decision of the United States 
Supreme Court to prescribe the 1993 federal discovery revisions may 
partially explain the determination of the Arizona Supreme Court to 
promulgate the discovery amendments in 1992. Nevertheless, the Arizona 
provisions differed somewhat from the federal changes apparently because 
of dissatisfaction with the federal modifications and because the Arizona 
Supreme Court seemingly wished to tailor the reform of discovery and the 
pretrial process more precisely to the perceived problems with discovery 
and the litigation system in the Arizona state courts. 65 Therefore, the new 
federal discovery revisions, which the United States Supreme Court 
recently promulgated and members of Congress did not modify, present a 
dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court. 
III. THE DILEMMA AND ITS RESOLUTION 
The Arizona Justices must in essence choose whether it is better to be 
uniform or right. Now that the new federal alterations have become 
effective, if the Arizona Supreme Court decides not to include these 
provisos in the Arizona discovery rules, Arizona civil discovery will 
diverge even more substantially from the federal scheme. This 
development would increase disuniformity and complexity in the federal 
and state discovery regimes and perhaps enlarge the cost and time necessary 
to complete discovery. 
When the Arizona Justices make the determination, the jurists should 
undertake a carefully-refined assessment of numerous, applicable 
considerations. Perhaps the most important question for the Arizona 
65. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26.1 Court Comment to 1991 Amendment. 
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Supreme Court is whether consistency between the Federal and Arizona Rules 
of Civil Procedure is outweighed by additional factors, such as the need to 
calibrate discovery strictures with any circumstances particular to the 
Arizona state courts. The Arizona Supreme Court will probably be unable 
to resolve this issue conclusively, until considerable empirical data has been 
collected, analyzed and synthesized. 
One significant factor for the court to consider will be the benefits and 
detriments of reinstituting uniformity between the federal and Arizona 
discovery systems. 66 The principal advantage of recapturing consistency 
would be the enhanced ability of lawyers and litigants to find, understand 
and satisfy one set of discovery measures that regulate practice in the 
federal and state courts of Arizona. Insofar as the federal and state schemes 
are identical or similar, these phenomena facilitate procedural compliance, 
make discovery simpler, and limit the expense and time which are needed to 
conclude discovery and complete cases. A return to uniformity should also 
enable the Arizona bench and bar to realize the benefits of relatively settled 
judicial construction of analogous provisions covering discovery and of the 
well-considered thinking of national experts in the area of procedure. 
However, it is important to recognize that the growing proliferation of 
local requirements, which implicate discovery at the federal and state levels, 
may simply frustrate efforts to reattain complete uniformity. For example, 
the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona include discovery measures that seemingly conflict with or 
duplicate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.67 The Local Rules of 
Practice for the Superior Courts in Arizona68 correspondingly incorporate 
provisions which govern discovery that apparently contravene or repeat 
those strictures which pertain to discovery in the Arizona Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The major disadvantage of making the Arizona discovery system 
consistent with the federal approach would be the loss of flexibility to treat 
special conditions that prevail in the Arizona state courts, which may differ 
66. Cure, supra note 34, at 56 n.6; Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization 
of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1422-25 (1992). 
67. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. R. 2.5, 2.7(c), App. A. (West 2001). See generally Tobias, supra 
note 66; Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 533 (Feb. 2002). 
68. See, e.g., Local Rules of Practice for the Superior Court of Coconino County, Rule 14 
(2001); Local Rules of Practice for the Superior Court of Yuma County, Rule 9 (2001). See 
generally Hink, supra note 44, at 22; Oakley & Coon, supra note 10. Certain Uniform Rules of 
Practice of the Superior Court of Arizona similarly contravened or repeated the strictures; 
however, the Court recently repealed or transferred the Uniform Rules. See supra note 59. 
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from circumstances in the ninety-four federal district courts and even the 
current situation in the· Arizona federal district. Related concerns might be 
the abandonment of discovery reforms familiar to the Arizona bench and 
bar and the concomitant need to learn of, comprehend and apply different 
procedural requirements. Insofar as Arizona has applied measures that the 
federal courts and other states have not employed, the reestablishment of 
uniformity could also eliminate Arizona's valuable contribution as a 
laboratory for experimentation with promising mechanisms. 
Another important consideration will be the relative efficacy of the new 
federal discovery requirements and the discovery reforms implemented by 
the Arizona state courts during the 1990s. The federal strictures essentially 
narrow the information which attorneys and litigants have been able to 
secure through discovery and automatic disclosure. 69 The changes, 
therefore, generally favor defendants more than plaintiffs, who have the 
burden of proving their cases, and many of whom need rather broad 
discovery to make this proof. 70 Of course, it is impossible to ascertain 
precisely what impacts the federal proposals will have, until federal district 
judges have actually applied the new provisions and those procedures have 
received careful evaluation. Nonetheless, historical experience with 
discovery, particularly the 1983 and 1993 amendments which were intended 
to contain discovery,7 1 suggests that the modifications will have the 
consequences mentioned immediately above. The comparative effectiveness 
of the presumptive limitations on the number of interrogatories and 
depositions, which the United States Supreme Court imposed in 1993 and 
which the Arizona Supreme Court prescribed during 1991, may 
correspondingly inform understanding of how the temporal restrictions on 
depositions mandated by the new federal revisions will operate. 72 
The Arizona Supreme Court should attempt to determine exactly how 
well its discovery reforms instituted during the 1990s have worked. For 
instance, it would be helpful to know whether the Arizona automatic 
disclosure requirements have promoted the early revelation of information 
which has facilitated the resolution of civil lawsuits, especially by fostering 
settlement, or whether the strictures have led to contentious disagreements 
69. See Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 775-76; Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 
744--45. 
70. See Thornburg, supra note 26, at 229-31; Tobias, supra note 66, at 1441-42; see also 
Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89) 
(analyzing plaintiff's proof in civil rights cases). 
71. See Marcus, Discovery, supra note 16, at 760-68. 
72. See supra notes 26, 32, 62, infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. The 1991 
revision of Arizona Rule 30(a) imposed presumptive limitations on depositions' length. 
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and unnecessary, costly and time-consuming satellite litigation over 
precisely what must be divulged. The Arizona Supreme Court might 
correspondingly institute efforts to ascertain whether presumptive discovery 
limitations on depositions and interrogatives have saved expense or tim·e, an 
inquiry that experience with the federal analogues could inform, 73 arid 
whether according judges increased control over the pretrial process and 
discovery has improved civil dispute resolution. 
The Justices should carefully assemble, analyze and synthesize. the 
maximum, feasible empirical data respecting these questions. Minimal 
empirical data currently exist because the Arizona Supreme Court has 
undertaken no formal attempt to study the impacts of the recent reforms 
generally, while baselines for comparing the effects of discovery devices' 
application have yet to be established specifically. 74 Several of the 
applicable· issues may concomitantly resist precise empirical verification, 
and a few questions apparently defy definitive resolution. 
Nevertheless, some relevant information might be available and certain 
raw data could be analyzed and synthesized. Moreover, the Arizona 
Supreme Court may be able to survey judges, lawyers and litigants in the 
state regarding their perceptions or to gather anecdotal information. The 
Justices should also seriously consider commissioning an assessment by an 
expert, independent evaluator, such as the National Center for State Courts 
or the State Justice Institute, each of which has previously analyzed 
procedures that the Arizona trial courts implemented. 75 Another helpful 
possibility could be the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation. 
This research entity recently completed a comprehensive examination of 
expense and delay reduction techniques, including a broad spectrum of 
discovery and disclosure mechanisms that resemble the Arizona state court 
reforms of the 1990s, with which the ninety-four federal districts 
experimented between 1990 and 1997. 76 
A related, instructive source that the Justices may consult is federal 
district court data. District court experience with the implementation, and 
evaluators' assessment, of the 1993 federal rules revisions would be 
particularly helpful, especially the amendments imposing automatic 
73. See supra note 72, infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
74. Huntwork interviews, supra note 64. 
75. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10701 (1994) (authorizing the State Justice Institute). 
76. See, e.g., JAMES s. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARJSON DISTRJCTS (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND 
INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ACT ( 1996); see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and 
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 525 (1998). 
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disclosure and presumptive limitations on interrogatories and depositions. 77 
The federal changes differed somewhat from the 1992 Arizona alterations; 78 
however, the respective provisions governing disclosure and presumptive 
limitations are sufficiently similar so that material related to the efficacy of 
the federal revisfons can increase understanding of the Arizona 
amendments. Of course, the recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court to narrow the scope of automatic disclosure apparently suggests that 
the federal rule revisors had some concerns about the procedure's operation, 
even as the determination to impose presumptive limitations on the length 
of depositions seemingly indicates a measure of satisfaction with this 
h . 79 tee mque. 
An additional, significant factor will be the tolerance of the judiciary and 
practicing attorneys in Arizona for greater discovery reform. Too much or 
too frequent modification can exceed the patience of judges and lawyers 
who must find, master and employ the new requirements. At some 
juncture, the bench and bar will tire of, or find overly expensive, the effort 
to discover, understand and apply incessantly changing strictures. Judges 
and counsel in Arizona could well have reached that point. If so, it might 
be advisable to impose a moratorium on discovery reform. 8° For example, 
the Arizona Supreme Court could study the efficacy of the discovery 
revisions instituted during the 1990s, while the Justices might await analysis 
of the effectiveness of the federal amendments that district judges have been 
applying since late 2000. 
Any effort to provide recommendations for resolving the dilemma 
presented by new federal discovery proposals would be presumptuous and 
fraught with difficulty. Numerous ideas examined above suggest that the 
Justices can best make this decision by consulting the maximum, relevant, 
empirical data which expert, independent evaluators have systematically 
collected, assessed and synthesized. However, that information has yet to 
be assembled. Notwithstanding these substantial complications, a few 
recommendations can be offered. 
77. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Willging, supra note 76; 
see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (analyzing disclosure and presumptive 
limitations). 
78. See supra notes 24-26, 59-63 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 24, 26, 32, 72 and accompanying text. 
80. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 
59 BROOK L. REV. 841, 856 (1993); Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 801, 839 (1995). 
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For several reasons, the best approach during the immediate future 
would apparently be to defer consideration of the 2000 federal amendments. 
These reasons are the federal rule revisors' seeming penchant for 
increasingly frequent, and often contradictory, alteration of the discovery 
requirements;81 the apparent efficacy of the Arizona discovery reforms 
instituted during the 1990s; the peculiar circumstances that presently exist 
in the Arizona state courts; and the need for careful analysis of the new 
federal amendments and the recent Arizona reforms. Once the federal 
modifications have received application and close evaluation in all ninety-
four federal district courts and the Arizona Justices have scrutinized their 
reforms of the 1990s, the Arizona Supreme Court should be able to make 
several important judgments with greater certainty than is possible today. 
The Justices can probably determine more conclusively whether the new 
federal changes deserve adoption and whether a return to uniformity is 
required. The Arizona Supreme Court could also ascertain whether the 
Arizona reforms have been successful enough to warrant retention, or if 
Arizona's situation is sufficiently unusual and troubling to necessitate 
continued application, and, thus, the perpetuation of inconsistency between 
the federal and state discovery regimes. In short, the Arizona Justices will 
need better information than is currently available to make the finest 
decision with the requisite confidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Arizona Supreme Court maintained much consistency between the 
discovery systems in the Arizona and the federal trial courts until the 1990s. 
The new federal discovery amendments, which became applicable in late 
2000, pose a dilemma for the Justices. If the Arizona Supreme Court rejects 
those revisions, the Justices will allow Arizona discovery to depart further 
from the federal scheme and the court may well jeopardize the possibility of 
reinstituting uniformity. Should members of the court adopt the federal 
modifications, the Justices might threaten certain recent reforms in Arizona 
discovery and impose changes that are not tailored to the conditions 
presently existing in the state trial courts and require judges, lawyers and 
litigants to find, comprehend and use another set of strictures. The 
preferable approach at this juncture appears to be deferral of the decision to 
prescribe or reject the new federal proposals as well as systematic 
81. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. See generally Paul V. Niemeyer, Here 
We Go Again: Are The Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 517 (1998); Subrin, Fishing, supra note 6, at 739-45. 
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assessment of these requirements and of the discovery reforms that the 
Arizona Supreme Court instituted during the 1990s. Once the court has 
secured and consulted the maximum relevant information, it should be able 
to determine more definitively whether the new federal amendments will 
actually improve Arizona civil discovery. 
